Before 1916 there were no major sea battles
between Britain and Germany,
The British Grand Fleet kept to the safety of Scapa Flow
in the Orkney Island while the German High Seas Fleet were
blockaded into ports such as Wilhelmshaven.
However, in January 1916 Admiral von Scheer was put in charge
of the High Seas Fleet. He was eager for action. He sent
Admiral von Hipper with 40 ships as a ‘bait’
squadron to sweep along the Danish coast to try and lure
the British Fleet into a trap. He aimed to follow on with
the remainder of the fleet to join the attack once the trap
had been sprung.
Unluckily for Scheer a drowned German sailor had previously
been washed ashore on a Russian beach carrying a book containing
all Germany’s radio codes. With this available the
British were able to decipher the coded orders Scheer sent
to his ships.
Learning of Hipper’s departure the British Admiral
Jellicoe gave instructions for the Grand Fleet to put to
sea. An advance scouting force of 52 ships, led by the impetuous
Admiral Beatty encountered the ‘bait’ squadron.
After an exchange of fire resulting in the loss of two British
cruisers, Beatty spotted the German High Seas Fleet moving
in and turned his ships. In a “run to the north”
he headed straight for the Grand Fleet with Hipper in pursuit.
The two main forces met off the coast of Jutland in Denmark
and a fierce running battle ensued. As darkness fell Sheer’s
fleet turned away and headed for home. Jellicoe did not
try to chase Sheer for he feared that German submarines
and mines were close by. He too turned round and made for
home. |
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Scheer and the German Navy immediately claimed victory
based on the number of ships destroyed. Whereas the British Navy lost
3 battle cruisers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers (6,100 casualties);
the German navy lost 1 battleship, 1 battle cruiser, 4 light cruisers
and 3 destroyers (2,550).
Admiral Jellicoe was criticised for being over-cautious, but he argued
that it was vitally important to protect the size of his Grand Fleet.
Whereas Jellicoe was able to inform the British government on 2nd
June that the Grand Fleet was ready for further action, the German
High Seas Fleet had to be reconstructed and was never in the position
to risk another major North Sea confrontation. Jellicoe was therefore
able to claim that his tactics were justified by the battle's long-term
effects.
Source A: Sea power and
victory.
On 21 November 1918, under the terms
of the Armistice agreement, the most powerful units of the German
High Sea Fleet surrendered to Admiral Beatty, off the Firth of
Forth.
German sailors surrender at Scapa Flow |
This was the result of Allied victory
on land, but that victory had only been possible because of Allied
command of the sea. Only because of the ability to use the seas
had the armies that were victorious in 1918 been supplied and
maintained.
The various other land campaigns around the world also depended
on the use of the sea. Sea power had maintained the Allied nations
in food, fuel and raw materials. Conversely it had starved the
Central Powers of all kinds of supplies, in a ruthless blockade
that had contributed to their final collapse.
Germany
could never have been defeated at sea as Britain could have been.
Germany's army was the mainstay of her power, and the only way
it could be defeated was by other armies, supported by sea power.
In the words of an Admiralty paper, the Navy and the mercantile
marine it supported in the years 1914-18 had been 'the spearshaft
of which the Allied armies have been the point'
Dr. Eric Grove
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